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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. program in Transnational and 
European Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/ Mediation at the 
International Hellenic University.  
It examines the principles of processing of personal data according to the GDPR, 
aiming to point out their impact. Processing is every operation performed on personal 
data. Personal data is now every information relating to a natural person. We live in 
the ‘age of information’, thus the European legislation on the protection of the 
personal data ‘touches’ every occupation and every social activity. Such immensity of 
the scope makes it impossible for the legislator to foresee every possible issue. 
Therefore, the GDPR may contain numerous and detailed provisions, but the core of it 
are the abstract principles, which have evolved the past 40-50 years and reflect the 
rationale of the legislation.    
In order to analyze and assess the principles of the GDPR, one has to have a historical 
and cultural overview of their ‘source’, the concept of privacy, which is already 
elevated to the status of a fundamental right in Europe. Hence, this paper will first try 
to present a brief history of privacy and personal data protection, how they are 
conceived in Europe and other parts of the world, then an analysis of the principles 
and finally the difficulties that their implementation faces as well as poses to other 
professional and social activities. 
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Introduction 
Beginning from a personal perspective, during 20 years of practice as a lawyer in the 
fields of commercial and civil law, I was regarding personal data protection law as an 
obstacle. When I was trying to collect evidence or other information, public servants 
were often refusing, barricading themselves behind the words ‘‘personal data’’, 
without ever explaining what that meant and what the violation consisted in; and 
usually without  giving the impression, that as ‘‘protectors of the personal data’’ knew 
and understood the provisions of the relevant legislation. Hence, what ‘’personal data 
protection’’ usually meant for a lawyer in Greece, was ‘‘keep your calm with the public 
servant’’ and ‘‘go to the district attorney’s office to get a disclosure order’’.   
Nevertheless, I have to admit that I hadn’t followed the six years discussion around the 
GDPR up until the coming to force. It gives me no credit to confess, that when a client 
running a small commercial enterprise asked me in April 2018, what to do to comply 
with the new Regulation, I reassured him that there were no particular measures to be 
taken for the time being and that I would get back to him.1 What I didn’t explicitly 
replied, was that at the time I didn’t have a clue (a lawyer rather seldom admits 
ignorance).  
I began studying the GDPR, trying to locate specific new obligations for SMEs and I was 
struck with its structure, complexity and volume of provisions. Compared to the 34 
articles of the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC (DPD95) there were now 99 articles, 
appearing to construct a new and much more detailed legal regime. What also struck 
me was the coexistence of abstract provisions and detailed technicalities. At the time I 
was rather busy with a couple of litigation cases, and I couldn’t spend more than a few 
hours, which I thought would be enough not to become an expert, but to spot the 
obligations and technicalities and to compose a concise checklist of alerts and steps, to 
provide to my client. But I quickly realized, that a few hours or even a couple of days 
wouldn’t be enough for me to feel confident that I understood the regime and that I 
wouldn’t miss an important detail.   
 
1 The date of entry into force and application was 25 May 2018, article 99 GDPR 
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So, I started wondering, why this Regulation had to be so extensive and so complex. 
What was clear from the beginning, was that the scope of the GDPR is very broad as it 
is addressing every business, public authority, agency or other body,2 irrespective of its 
size and occupation; it is including in its scope every piece of information ‘relating to 
an identified or identifiable natural person’3; and it is regulating ‘any operation or set of 
operations which is performed on personal data’4. Moreover, the complexity of the 
provisions and the sophistication of the technical obligations for the controllers and 
processors gave me the impression that this Regulation had to be having its sights 
primarily on Google, Facebook and the rest of the tech giants, or on large corporations 
handling personal data, such as banks and insurance companies, not each and every 
business which keeps simple records of its clientele.  
At the same time, I noticed at the internet the confusion and the same anxiety, that 
my client had had and I also noticed the appearance of an army of self-declared 
experts, who were promising to adapt businesses to the new data protection regime, 
to ensure compliance and avoidance of the severe new penalties and even train others 
to become certified experts themselves. Finally, I noticed around the end of the spring 
of 2018 a steep increase of difficulties to obtain information and to carry out my every-
day occupational tasks, such as access to the courts’ archives, published wills, public 
documents and even documents of incorporation of companies. 
All these considered, the new provisions, which the GDPR introduced, may be 
complex, demanding and hard to approach, generating the recent agitation, 
nevertheless it is the set of the principles of processing5, what constitutes the 
framework of the personal data protection. They are quite abstract,6 they reflect the 
spirit of the regulation and lie in its core. They are almost the same as in the DPD95, 
but they are now regarded as more ‘‘serious’’ than before, because of the volume and 
the complexity of the adjacent new provisions.   
This paper will try to focus on these most important provisions of GDPR, the principles 
of personal data processing, their basis, evolution, interpretation and impact. 
 
2 article 4 (7)  
3 article 4 (1) 
4 article 4 (2) 
5 Articles 5, 6 and 7 
6 as it is always with legal principles 
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It will first try to explain why personal data enjoy such an elevated state of protection, 
especially in Europe, by approaching the concept, or rather the fundamental right in 
privacy, the history of its regulation and the dominant views about it in some parts of 
the world. The scope is quite wide, as it encompasses elements from philosophy, 
history and national mores. An in-depth coverage is impossible, therefore an effort will 
be made, to point out some characteristic points and to extract some deductions. 
Finally, some worries will be presented about the impact of the principles of the GDPR.   
  -5- 
1. THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY 
“If this is the age of information, then privacy is the issue of our times”.7 Today’s 
onslaught of digital information technology is widely seen as a clandestine threat to 
privacy, because of the trails of everybody’s personal data left knowingly and 
unknowingly in the internet. 8 
Now that the personal data, according to the GDPR, is every information relating to an 
identified or identifiable natural person, privacy which is acknowledged by the 
European human rights legislation as a fundamental right9, is the gnomon to 
determine, when the personal data should be protected. In order to develop effective 
data protection principles, the very nature and significance of privacy had to be 
conceived. To do so, the private from the public has to be distinguished.10 Despite 
theories developed by numerous scholars across a wide range of disciplines, the 
nature of privacy remains a controversial, ambiguous and subjective concept. A 
general theory stumbles upon the fact that privacy is to be circumscribed by the 
ephemeral social contexts across different cultures, and the varying, subjective specific 
views of individuals moving inside such social contexts.11 
1.1. The beginning of the discussion in the USA  
The concept of a ‘’right to privacy’’ as referring to control over personal information 
was famously introduced by US scholars Warren and Brandeis in an eponymous article. 
They drew references from the French law of the press and described the right they 
supported as ‘‘the right to be let alone’’.12 The argumentation of the article was so 
influential, that it is considered as the basis of the discussion on the regulation of 
privacy.  
 
7 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte, George Loewenstein, 'Privacy and human behavior in the age 
of information', Science 347 (2015), p. 509. 
8 Sheng Yin Soh, Privacy Nudges: An Alternative Regulatory Mechanism to Informed Consent for Online 
Data Protection Behaviour, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. (2019), p. 65. 
9 Article 8 ECHR 
10 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.26 
11 Kirsty Hughes, A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and Its Implications for Privacy Law, 75 Mod. L. 
Rev. 806 (2012). 
12 Samuel D. Warren, Louis D. Brandeis, ‘The right to privacy’, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 5. (Dec. 
15, 1890), pp. 195, 214. 
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1.2. Theories of categorization of privacy 
1.2.1. Categories of privacy torts 
 
Hence, in 1960, another US scholar, William Prosser, acknowledged a privacy tort, 
distinguishing four types of it: the intrusion upon a person’s solitude or seclusion; the 
appropriation, for commercial purposes, of a person’s name, likeness, or personality; 
the public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about a person; and the publicity 
that places a person in a false light in the public eye.13  
Nevertheless, privacy protection in the USA eventually found its way not only in tort 
law, but also in constitutional law, (although not explicitly) as referring to the right for 
individuals to refuse interferences from the government.14 
1.2.2. States of privacy 
 
Equally influential was Alan Westin's ‘‘states of privacy’’, placing information to the 
core of the concept of privacy. In his words: ‘‘privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, 
or institutions to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information 
about them is communicated to others’’. 15 Westin categorized privacy into four 
‘‘states’’: solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve. Solitude means total physical 
separation from others. Intimacy involves close, relaxed, and frank relationships inside 
a small unit. Anonymity is ‘‘the desire of individuals for times of public privacy’’ and 
reserve, is the ‘‘erection’’ of a psychological barrier to limit communication about 
himself.16 
1.2.3. Theory of spheres 
 
Meanwhile, in post-war Germany, the German Federal Constitutional Court had 
adopted the ‘‘theory of the spheres’’17, according to which, a series of concentric 
 
13 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.27 
14 Ibid., p.28 
15 Ibid., p.31 
16 Kirsty Hughes, A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and Its Implications for Privacy Law, 75 Mod. L. 
Rev. 811 (2012). 
17 Sphärentheorie 
  -7- 
circles, delineating different areas, based on distinct degrees of the private, derive 
from the general right to free development of personality18; the  ‘‘Individualsphäre’’, 
the ‘‘Privatsphäre’’ and the ‘‘Intimsphäre’’.19  
1.2.4. Various other categorizations   
 
Other scholars tried to identify the scope of privacy rights by categorizing them into 
those that protect private places; those that seek to establish a realm of private 
decision-making; those that are based upon managing private information; and those 
that encompass limiting access to self. Others have focused upon “privacy problems”, 
such as surveillance and information processing20.   
Still, although the above concepts of ‘’states’’, ‘‘spheres’’, ‘’places’’ etc. aim to define 
the concept of privacy, they also have to be defined. Does the ‘‘Privatsphäre’’ exist 
inside a concrete place, particularly ‘‘at home’’, or anywhere the subject so desires? 
For example, does the workplace fall into the private or public sphere/state/life of an 
employee?  
In the Niemetz v Germany judgment 21 the ECtHR acknowledged that it is not possible 
(and even necessary!) to distinguish between private and working life, since inside the 
workplace people may coexist with employers and other employees, but it can in the 
same time be a place where people develop intimate human relationships. Therefore, 
found in 2017 that the concept of private life must be interpreted broadly, including 
the right to ‘‘lead a private social life at work’’. 22 So, the description of privacy 
according to the famous English quote ‘‘a man's home is his castle’’23 appears too 
narrow for the European Judge. Accordingly, the Article 88 of the GDPR acknowledged 
the respect for privacy at workplaces as well. 
 
18 allgemeine Persönlichkeitsrecht 
19 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.24-26 
20 Daniel Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, California Law Review (2002), p.1096-1099  
21 Niemietz v. Germany, ECHR 72/1991/324/396, 16 December 1992, par.29  
22 Antovic and Mirkovic vs Montenegro, ECHR App. Nu. 70838/13 par.41; Elena Kaiser, Monitoring 
Employees with Hidden Surveillance Cameras Breaches Their Right to Privacy, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 
398 (2018). 
23 Sir Edward Coke, The Institutes of the Laws of England, 1628 
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1.2. Reasonable expectation theory 
Such blurred lines about where privacy should be respected and where it doesn’t exist, 
led to the conception of subjective tools such as the ‘‘reasonable expectation privacy’’ 
test, which was first developed in the United States, in the Fourth Amendment case 
‘‘Katz’’24 and is used by the ECtHR in its Article 8 ECHR jurisprudence.25 In short, if the 
employee wasn’t adequately informed about being under surveillance by the employer 
and had ‘’a reasonable expectation’’ that such surveillance was not taking place, then 
there was a breach of his privacy rights.26 
However, the critique in the other side of the Atlantic is that whilst ‘'at first glance’' 
the test '’seems quite sensible’', it ‘'has failed to live up to its aspirations’' and that 
‘'subsequent to the test's development, the US Supreme Court adopted a conception of 
privacy that countless commentators have found to be overly narrow, incoherent, 
short-sighted, deleterious to liberty, and totally out of touch with society'’.27 
Moreover, such subjective tools do not take account of what Spiros Simitis 
characterizes: ‘‘a unique experience: an unprecedented readiness to expose even the 
most private data.’’ He eloquently observes that: ‘‘The same people who otherwise 
insist on the inaccessibility of their private sphere, have evidently not the slightest 
hesitation to publicly revealing all its details. It is no wonder that social networking 
information, provided, for instance, by widespread flirting on Facebook, is now used in 
the United Kingdom as a divorce reason in every fifth divorce or separation case. An 
evaluation of chatting on the Internet has shown that it manifestly contributed to the 
proliferation of divorces in the last two years.’’28 
Others name such trends as the '’privacy paradox’'. Despite empirical studies showing 
that internet users are generally aware of the threats to their privacy and are 
concerned about the potential misuse of their personal information, these concerns do 
not necessarily translate into adopting privacy protection measures or behaviors 
 
24 Katz vs United States 389 US 347 (1967) 
25 Kirsty Hughes, A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and Its Implications for Privacy Law, 75 Mod. L. 
Rev. 824 (2012). 
26 Barbulescu vs Romania, ECHR App. Nu. 61496/08 par.56; Antovic and Mirkovic vs Montenegro, ECHR 
App. Nu. 70838/13 par.43 
27 Daniel Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 2010 Boston College Low Review (2010) p. 1519  
28 Spiros Simitis, Privacy - An Endless Debate, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 2004 (2010). 
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online and even freely disclose their data. According to behavioral psychology this 
privacy paradox is due to the limits and fallacies in individual decision-making 29. 
1.2. Conclusions on the privacy theories  
The conclusions from these brief remarks are that: 
1. Privacy is a fundamental right;30 legally sacred. 
2. It has to be protected against both private entities and the state. 
3. We cannot objectively define the borders of privacy. 
4. Tools such as ‘’reasonable expectations’’ tests collide to the unexpected 
irrationalities of human behavior.  
Therefore, it appears very difficult to regulate the processing of personal data through 
concrete rules. The protection has to be based on abstract principles, concretized by a 
designated public authority and finally, as always with legal principles, by the judge. 
Such hardships in defining the privacy rights and the adequate personal data 
protection are reflected in the history of the evolution of privacy protection law.  
 
2. PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION HISTORY  
The recognition of a right to privacy or data protection as a legal right is quite recent.31 
Before World War II specific aspects of private life were legally regulated such as the 
inviolability of the home, or confidentiality of correspondence.32 
 
 
29 Sheng Yin Soh, Privacy Nudges: An Alternative Regulatory Mechanism to Informed Consent for Online 
Data Protection Behaviour, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 69 (2019). 
30 Art 8 ECHR 
31 Franziska Boehm, Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice, Springer [2012] p.3 
32 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.23 
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2.1. International treaties 
2.1.1. UN Universal Human Rights Declaration 
 
In the aftermath of World War II, in 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
adopted the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights. Article 12 introduced the 
prohibition against arbitrary interference with privacy. The provision distinguished 
privacy from the concepts of family, home and correspondence, implying that the 
former consists of elements that fall outside of the concepts of the three later, which 
are more definable. This is a direct acknowledgment, that private is not only home, 
family matters and correspondence, although they are the key elements.  
2.1.2. ECHR and Convention (108) 
 
Following, in 1949, ten European states intending to promote the rule of law, 
democracy, human rights and social development found the Council of Europe (CoE), 
which adopted the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950. Article 8 of the 
Convention introduced the protection of privacy, repeating from the Declaration the 
quartet of privacy, family, home and correspondence.  
In order to clarify and specify the framework of privacy protection of Article 8 the 
Convention 10833 was adopted in 1981. It offered provisions for the automatic 
processing of personal data by both private and public entities, was ratified by 55 
states,34 and is the only binding international instrument specifically on data 
protection, distinguishing the concept from privacy. 35 
 
 
 
 
33 Convention for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data 
34 Among them all of the European Union members 
35 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights and Council of Europe, 'Handbook on European data 
protection law' (2014) 14 <https://rm.coe.int/16806b294a>. 
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2.2. EU Regulation 
2.2.1. Directive 95/46/EC 
 
From that point on, the EU took over legislation enacting the Directive 95/46/EC 
(DPD95), which introduced in a European level a concise system of provisions, 
providing the guidelines for the national laws. Importantly, the continuity to the (non-
EU) ECHR was specifically stated in Recital 10 of the DPD95, which refers to Article 8 
ECHR.  
The DPD95 was followed by European legislation providing rules in specific areas of the 
law, such as Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the processing of personal data by the 
Community institutions,36 on privacy and electronic communications37 and on the 
electronic communications sector.38  
As DPD95 was progressively implemented into the national legal order of the Member 
States, the concepts of personal data, and data protection, spread throughout Europe. 
However, the from-state-to-state implementation of the Directive resulted in national 
differences, especially in relation to conflicts between personal data protection and 
other fundamental rights.39 
2.2.2. EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights 
 
In 2000 the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights was signed in Nice by the member 
states and came into force in 2009. The Charter was the first catalogue of rights ever 
agreed jointly by the three major EU institutions and designated the rights it 
recognizes as fundamental. Article 8 of the Charter provided a right not generally to 
privacy, but specifically for the protection of personal data.40 
However, according to the Charter, the corresponding rights of ECHR and the Charter 
deriving from the main sources of fundamental human rights protection, are to be 
 
36 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 
37 Directive 2002/58/EC 
38 Directive 2009/136/EC 
39 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.156 
40 Matthew White, Immigration Exemption and the European Convention on Human Rights, 5 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 26 (2019). 
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interpreted as the same.41 Thus, the meaning and scope of the right to protection of 
personal data42 and the right to private life43 have been interpreted as effectively the 
same by the European Courts of Justice. The CJEU found that ‘‘In those circumstances, 
it must be considered that the right to respect for private life with regard to the 
processing of personal data, recognized by Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, concerns any 
information relating to an identified or identifiable individual and the limitations which 
may lawfully be imposed on the right to the protection of personal data correspond to 
those tolerated in relation to Article 8 of the Convention’’, thus merging the two 
concepts as “the right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of 
personal data”.44 
2.3. National legislation 
On national level, several European countries, had adopted laws providing rules on the 
processing of personal data before the adoption of the DPD95. 
2.3.1. State of Hesse 
 
Pioneer had been the Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz45 in 1970, of the German federal 
state of Hesse. The provisions of the law, which for the first time adopted the term 
‘‘data protection’’ and not generally ‘‘privacy’’, were primarily designed by Spiros 
Simitis, who is since honorably called in Germany the ‘father of data protection’.46  
The Law regulated data protection introducing provisions for the lawful processing of 
records and data such as the collection, storage and transmission and the avoidance of 
interference by an unauthorized person.47 
 
41 EU Charter, art 52(3). 
42 EU Charter, art 8 
43 ECHR, art 8 
44 Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Marcus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v Land Hessen [2010] 
EU:C: 2010:662, para 52.; Jessica Bell; Stergios Aidinlis; Hannah Smith; Miranda Mourby; Heather 
Gowans; Susan E. Wallace; Jane Kaye, Balancing Data Subjects' Rights and Public Interest Research, 5 
Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 46 (2019),  
45 data protection law 
46 Anne Hardy, ‘Spiros Simitis: Es geht um Eure Daten!’ Marketing und Kommunikation Goethe-
Universität Frankfurt am Main, https://idw-online.de/de/news635029 
47 Section 2 of 1970 Hesse Data Protection Act. 
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2.3.2. Sweden 
 
In 1973, Sweden, another pioneering state in the theory of the data protection 
legislation had adopted a law named ‘‘Datalag’’48, which was the first national law 
regulating automated data processing. 49 
2.3.3. Germany 
 
Following the Hessisches Datenschutzgesetz, in 1977, Germany had enacted its first 
Federal Data Protection Law or Law on Protection Against the Misuse of Personal Data 
in Data Processing,50 which covered the regulation concerning private processing of 
personal data as well.51 
In 1978, France had endorsed a law entitled “informatique et libertes”52 and Austria 
was the first state in 1978 to advance a right called ‘‘right to data protection’’ as a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right. 53 
2.3.4. Rest of Europe 
 
At the same time in the 1970s other European countries, such as Denmark, Norway 
and Luxembourg passed relevant legislation as well.54 
2.4. USA 
In the other side of the Atlantic, the US adopted the Privacy Act in 1974, with the 
formal purpose of safeguarding individual privacy from the misuse of federal records 
and providing individuals access to them.55 
 
 
48 Data Act 
49 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.58 
50 Gesetz zum Schutz vor Missbrauch personenbezogener Daten bei der Datenverarbeitung, 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG 
51 Gloria González Fuster, The Emergence of Personal Data Protection as a Fundamental Right of the EU, 
2014, Springer, p.60 
52 Computers and freedoms, Ibid., p.21 
53 Ibid, p.71 
54 Ibid, p.65 
55 Ibid., p.35 
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3. RATIONALE OF THE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION  
The evolution of the European regulation of privacy or personal data reflects cultural 
elements, collective mentalities and idiosyncrasies of the relevant nations.56 
 
3.1. Memories of oppressive regimes 
Especially in Europe, the State’s abuse of surveillance and record keeping during the 
Second World War and Cold War, left deep scars in the minds of the Europeans, a fact 
that explains the elevation of the protection of privacy, not only to a positive legal 
level, but to a fundamental, constitutional right.57 
Even cases of record keeping by liberal governments sometimes didn’t escape abuses. 
An extreme example is the Dutch population information systems of the 1930s serving 
the improvement of administrative efficiency. The data collected, contained religious 
elements as well, as was then common. When the Netherlands were occupied by Nazi 
Germany, those archives helped the Nazis to efficiently trace the Dutch Jews.58 
3.1.1. Germany 
 
Therefore, it is understandable that the Germans are not only the pioneers in data 
protection, but also among the most jealous proponents of data protection.  
However, any foreigner who found himself in a German spa without having been 
warned, may feel the least awkward before the sight of completely nude men and 
women. Germans don’t call like the Americans ‘‘private parts’’ what according to them 
everybody has. The paradox is that they are very private people when it comes to 
personal data such as names, telephone numbers or addresses, in sharp contrast to 
the Americans. The reason for this is thought to be memories of the Gestapo and 
 
56 Simon Davies, The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle, 2 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 294 (2016). 
57 David J. Stute, Privacy Almighty? The CJEU's Judgment in Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 
649 (2015). 
58 David Lazer; Victor Mayer-Schoenberger, Drawing Lessons for the DNA Data Banks from Other 
Government Data Systems, 34 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366, 368 (2006), David J. Stute, Privacy Almighty? The 
CJEU's Judgment in Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 652 (2015). 
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Stasi.59 The widespread subconscious ‘‘Angst’’ of ordinary Germans that they are 
under surveillance.  
Such feelings often touching the realms of conspiracy theories, were recently 
reinforced by the revelations about the NSA surveillance scandal.60 Even the fact that 
the otherwise progressive Germans still mistrust electronic means of payment and 
prefer cash, has its roots in their obsession with surveillance and personal data.61 
Such mistrust of government practices persisted in the subconscious not only of the 
Germans, but of a significant part of the Europeans and gradually with the advent of 
digital technology transformed to a contemporary set of ‘‘crises of trust’’ in individuals, 
organizations and social groups.62 
3.1.2. Greece 
 
Similarly, the Greek post War anti-liberal governments’ and particularly the military 
junta’s practice of keeping files not just for dissidents, but for a broad part of the 
population, even today subconsciously corelates the collection of personal data by the 
state, to oppression. 
3.1.3. USA 
 
The United States having not felt the rule of a totalitarian state and firmly believing to 
be the nation of the free people, approach the regulation differently. For instance, 
freedom of press outweighs privacy much more often than in Europe.63  
Nevertheless, the truth is that the American citizens are also worried about their 
privacy, as shown by a 2000 Washington Post survey which found that 86 per cent of 
users are either very concerned or somewhat concerned about electronic privacy.64 
 
59Sabine Davis, https://www.handelsblatt.com/today/handelsblatt-explains-why-germans-are-so-
private-about-their-data/23572446.html?ticket=ST-855776-drIUHOli4Cr0ITOmTLsf-ap4 
60 Der Spiegel, 28-10-2013 p.21 
61 https://www.dw.com/en/times-change-but-german-obsession-with-cash-endures/a-43718626 
62 Ethics Advisory Group of the European Data Protection Supervisor, 2018 report p. 20 
63 Kurt Wimmer, Free Expression and EU Privacy Regulation: Can the GDPR Reach U.S. Publishers, 68 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 577 (2018). 
64 Theodore Grossman & Aaron M. Grossman, Understanding Internet Privacy: The US Perspective, 29 
Int'l Bus. Law. 391 (2001). 
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3.2. Digital technology 
Another big factor behind personal data regulation is the pace of digital technology. 
Technology has always generated concerns about unpredictable future consequences.  
The modern digital information technology creates to many people Orwellian 
anxieties: “The relentless march of the omnipresent and totalizing mediation of 
information technologies onto, and into, our daily lives, is like air, everywhere. Without 
air we die, yet with too much we die as well”.65 People believe that due to modern 
digital technology, never before so much information about them was available to 
others, they are confused about how to access such information and fear that if 
circumstances or motives change in the future, they are not going to be able to delete 
it.66    
Such worries are implicitly confirmed by recital 6 of the GDPR: ‘‘Rapid technological 
developments and globalisation’’.  Even though, as mentioned in the introduction, one 
of the supposed aims of the legislation is the facilitation of the free flow of 
information, and even though technology and globalization are the two key boosters 
of the flow of information, it seems, as later on will be suggested, that too much 
facilitation worries the European legislator.   
3.3. Ethics 
The Europeans supposedly base demands for privacy and personal data protection also 
from an ethical point of view to human dignity, which, as Kant famously wrote, 
mandates that people be treated as ends in themselves, not simply as means, tools or 
instrument of other's aims.67 
In that spirit James Whitman acknowledges that dignity concerns are weightier in 
Europe while liberty interests predominate in the United States.68 However, Spiros 
Simitis rejects this view of the European approach by Whitman, highlighting the 
European obligations to protect privacy in both their internal regulations and external 
 
65 Gary T. Marx, A Less Perfect but Freer Society, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 420 (2018). 
66 Bart van der Sloot, Editorial, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. p.3 (2019). 
67 Anita L. Allen, Debating Ethics and Digital Life, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 11 (2019). 
68 James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty, 113 Yale L.J. 1151 
(2004), David J. Stute, Privacy Almighty? The CJEU's Judgment in Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 Mich. J. 
Int'l L. 663 (2015). 
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agreements, without sacrificing liberty for dignity. 69 According to his view it is not 
dignity versus liberty, but the duty to secure the best possible privacy protection for 
persons concerned, while freedom of the press generally prevails over privacy in the 
United States. 70 
3.4. National mentalities 
3.4.1. France 
 
Apart from fears and ethics, other sorts of feelings are also present behind the 
evolution of the European privacy legislation.  
Take for example the less surveillance-phobic French. Behind the debate about 
personal data protection regulation in France, aside from the concept of privacy and 
the respect of it, hides the traditional French anti-Americanism and the rejection of the 
American culture as an expression of the legendary French chauvinism.  
In the eyes of the French, modern technology is one of the core elements of the 
‘‘American way of life’’. This is not to say that French are backwards or luddites; on the 
contrary, but technologies coming from the United States enjoy a ‘‘love-hate’’ 
relationship in France.  
President d'Estaing had commissioned the famous “1978 Nora-Minc Report”71 on the 
way computers may influence French society, with particular emphasis on 
telecommunications. The report had an enormous impact in France, constituting the 
theoretical foundation of the French nascent cyber policy and concluding that 
American digital hegemony poses an existential threat to the economic, social, and 
political fabric of the French nation and that France must develop an alternate model 
of cybergovernance to rival the domineering American computer industry.72  
The internet, as the most important ‘‘information highway’’ of today is the most 
characteristic example of a mistrusted technology in France, as it is dominated by the 
American tech giants.  
 
69 Spiros Simitis, Privacy - An Endless Debate, 98 Calif. L. Rev. 1993 (2010). 
70 Ibid., p.1994 
71 Zarine Kharazian, Yet Another French Exception: The Political Dimensions of France's Support for the 
Digital Right to Be Forgotten, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 454 (2017). 
72 Ibid., p.456 
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It is also resented, because the popularization of the internet happened approximately 
a decade after the launch of Minitel, an online service, accessible through telephone 
lines and the world's most successful online service prior to the World Wide Web. 73 It 
was installed in one million French homes by 1985 and at the end of the 1980s, nine 
million terminals were linked to some 25,000 Minitel services74, at a time when almost 
nobody outside the universities knew the internet. And yet, in a few years’ time the 
internet redefined the world, while Minitel fell in oblivion and was officially terminated 
in 2012. That was a blow for the French pride. Even a much-publicized mock trial of the 
Internet was held as the main attraction of a national festival in 1998, expressing the 
willingness of the French to lead the Western resistance against American digital 
hegemony.75  
Recently, the Edward Snowden revelations about the acts of surveillance of security 
agencies, fueled the skepticism of entrusting U.S. technology companies with large 
quantities of personal data.76 
Such mistrust and antipathy for the American digital information companies is 
characteristic in France, but by no means restricted there. It seems to be a dominant 
trend in Europe and it is reflected in the most famous judgment of the CJEU on 
personal data against the leading American player in the field of digital information 
technology, Google. 77 
3.4.2. Netherlands 
 
However dominant, this trend is not universal in Europe. For instance, in contrast to 
the CJEU, on two similar cases concerning the ‘‘right to be forgotten’’ a Dutch court in 
Amsterdam78 began by stressing that the right to privacy is not absolute, that the right 
 
73 Wikipedia, Minitel  
74 John Lichfield, How France fell out of love with Minitel, The Independent, 9 June 2012 
75 Zarine Kharazian, Yet Another French Exception: The Political Dimensions of France's Support for the 
Digital Right to Be Forgotten, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 453 (2017). 
76 David J. Stute, Privacy Almighty? The CJEU's Judgment in Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 
654 (2015). 
77 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL and Google Inc. v Agencia Espatiola de Protecci6n de Datos (AEPD) and 
Mario Costeja Gonzalez [2014] EU:C: 2014:317 
78 Rechtbank Amsterdam, 18 September 2014, ECLl:NL:RBAMS:2014;6118 and Rechtbank Amsterdam, 
13 February 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:716. 
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of freedom of expression is protected by the Dutch Constitution as well as the ECHR79 
and that because of the fact that the internet contains ‘'an ocean of information'’, 
search engines, such as Google, play an important role in society as they help people 
to find information online. If search engines were subject to too many restrictions, 
their cataloguing function would be hampered, resulting in a loss of credibility for 
those search engines.80  
Aside of the legal argumentation and the different approach to the balancing of rights 
between the CJEU and the Dutch Court, no doubt that a big role plays the approach to 
entrepreneurship. In terms of economic liberty, the Dutch (as well as the British and 
the Irish), are more liberal, strive more to attract foreign investments and enterprises, 
than the French and more or less the rest of Europe and are less hostile to American 
companies.  
It is likely that the CJEU when judging on “the right to be forgotten”, would consider 
more the freedom to expression, to information and to conduct business, if the search 
engine was European, if there was no dominance of Google and if the field was more 
fragmented and balanced between the continents.  
3.4.3. Japan 
 
Outside Europe, the reflection of national culture to the judicial approach to the 
protection of privacy, is even more characteristic in Japan.  
In contrast to the CJEU, the Supreme Court of Japan rejected in January 2017 a 
deletion claim against Google, putting higher emphasis on society's “right to know”.81 
The claimant had submitted that by using the search engine, his acquaintances could 
easily find out about his criminal record, that during the more than five years after the 
sentencing he could reflect on his actions and that he had started a new life.82 
With reference to Google's interest in publishing, the court stated that not only the 
individual's personal circumstances should be considered, but also the historical and 
 
79 Article 10 ECHR 
80 Stefan Kulk; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Freedom of Expression and Right to Be Forgotten Cases in 
the Netherlands after Google Spain, 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. p.120 (2015). 
81 Frederike Zufall, Challenging the EU's Right to Be Forgotten: Society's Right to Know in Japan, 5 Eur. 
Data Prot. L. Rev. 18 (2019). 
82 Ibid., p.20 
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social significance of the crime, its severity and importance for the parties, the purpose 
and necessity of mentioning the individual's full name in the publication, the important 
role of a search engine for freedom of expression and the “right to know” by providing 
the means to access relevant information to society. Regarding the legal 
argumentation, the court not only recognized the right of access to information, but 
also affirmed the search engine provider's own “freedom of expression”.83 
The different judicial approaches reflect the European individualism, placing the 
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection ahead of the general public interest, 
while in Japan it was more important whether the facts as such were in the public 
interest. Japanese law and judiciary thus take the viewpoint of society, placing the 
emphasis on social values, as the concept of social harmony is one of the key 
characteristics of Japanese culture.84 
 
4. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GDPR 
Having viewed the history of the regulation and some paradigms of cultural elements, 
we arrive to the GDPR, which was proposed as a data protection reform package in 
2012, adopted in 2016 and came to force in 2018. 
In part, the GDPR confirms choices made by the EU legislator and the CJEU in the 
context of the DPD95. However, many new elements have been introduced.85 Apart 
from the extended territorial scope, the most important are a much higher standard 
required of controllers and processors, greater accountability and transparency, a wide 
spectrum of reporting requirements,86 the accord of specific rights to the data 
subjects, among them particularly ‘‘the right to be forgotten’’,87 the introduction of the 
 
83 Ibid., p.22 
84 Ibid., p.23 
85 EDPB, Guidelines 3/2018 on the territorial scope of the GDPR (Article 3) - Version for public 
consultation, p.3 
86 Simon Davies, The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle, 2 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 290 (2016). 
87 Article 17 
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data processing officer,88 the organization of the independent supervisory authorities 
and of course the widely known and dreaded administrative fines.89 
All these provisions are important and the infringements can inflict serious 
consequences. However, the core of the data protection regulation in the EU are the 
principles of the processing of the personal data.  
It has been claimed that data protection law is ‘’a bundle of principles” and that they 
“carry the data protection architecture”,90 which is true, even if especially the GDPR 
contains numerous technicalities, procedures and specific provisions as well, which 
cannot be characterized as principles. 
The data protection law is based in the contemporary prevailing European ethics and 
principles are abstract expression of ethics. Their central role in the GDPR reflects the 
choice of the European regulators for the data protection rules to be ethics oriented. 
This is why the European Union Data Protection Supervisor urging for greater attention 
to ethics and an Ethics Advisory Group,91 issued a report early in 2018, “Towards a 
Digital Ethics”, highlighting the role of traditional European values of dignity, 
personhood and democracy in the protection of personal data in the modern digital 
age.92 
Such traditional values and ethics may be firmly established in Europe, but their 
context is constantly evolving. The principles of the European personal data protection 
serve the cause of the adaptation of the legislation to such evolution of the ethics. The 
need for such adaptation is greater when it concerns a fundamental right such as 
privacy, which is a mental construction and less tangible than life or property, for 
example. The European legislator acknowledges this reality and the inability to be 
constantly specific and up to date and gives way to the judge. The more principles the 
provisions of a law contain, the more the judge assumes the role of the legislator. This 
effects to more flexibility, but also less legal certainty. 
 
 
88 Articles 37-39 
89 Article 83 
90 Paul De Hert, Data Protection as Bundles of Principles, General Rights, Concrete Subjective Rights and 
Rules: Piercing the Veil of Stability Surrounding the Principles of Data Protection, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 
160 (2017). 
91 convened by the Supervisor Giovanni Buttarelli and chaired by J Peter Burgess 
92 Anita L. Allen, Debating Ethics and Digital Life, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 10 (2019). 
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4.1. OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
 
The principles of GDPR trace their origins in the Council of Europe and OECD Principles, 
both proclaimed in September 1980.  
The OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data introduced 8 Basic Principles of National Application: Collection Limitation, Data 
Quality, Purpose Specification, Use Limitation, Security Safeguards, Openness, 
Individual Participation, Accountability.93 
4.2. Convention 108 
Article 5 of the Convention (108) introduced the data quality principle which 
encompasses the principles of lawfulness94, legitimate purpose95, purpose limitation96 , 
accuracy97 and time limitation98. 
4.3. From Directive 95/46/EC to the GDPR 
The DPD95 named five almost identical predominant principles: The principle of 
lawfulness and fairness of the processing,99 the principle of purpose limitation,100 the 
principle of data minimization,101 the principle of accuracy102 and the principle of 
storage limitation.103 In a way these principles reflect the elements in the analysis of 
the proportionality,104 one of the foremost general principles of European law.105 
In terms of this continuous evolution of the European privacy law, under the GDPR, the 
principles for the processing are largely the same as those of DPD95 and Article 5 
 
93http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpe
rsonaldata.htm 
94 Art. 5 (a) 
95 Art. 5 (b) 
96 Art. 5 (c) 
97 Art. 5 (d) 
98 Art. 5 (e) 
99 Art. 6 (1) (a) 
100 Art. 6 (1) (b) 
101 “adequate, relevant and not excessive”, Art. 6 (1) (c) 
102 Art. 6 (1) (d) 
103Art. 6 (1) (e) 
104 Raphael Gellert, On Risk, Balancing, and Data Protection: A Response to van der Sloot, 3 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 182 (2017). 
105 Art. 5 TEU 
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GDPR is an enriched copy of Article 6 of the DPD95, 106 introducing some clarifications 
and additions: the element of transparency of data processing added to the principle 
of lawfulness and fairness, the principle of integrity and confidentiality and the 
principle of accountability. Outside article 5, new and more extensive conditions and 
elements for lawful processing are introduced in article 6 and special conditions for 
consent in article 7, which constitutes one of the bases for the lawfulness of the 
processing.107  
So, it may be supported that article 5 of the GDPR together with its clarifications and 
additions in Articles 6 and 7 contains the core of the general provisions on data 
processing108 and holds a central place in the Regulation. Infringement of the principles 
are explicitly subject to the administrative fines of up to 20.000.000 euros or up to 4 % 
of the total worldwide annual turnover.109    
Summing it up, the GDPR in article 5 sets out the seven key principles for processing 
personal information.  
4.3.1. First principle: “lawfulness, fairness and transparency” art. 5 (1) (a). Lawfulness 
 
The first and most important principle is labeled “principle of lawfulness, fairness and 
transparency”. The requirement all processing of personal data to have a lawful, fair 
and transparent basis. 'Processing' includes all activities that relate to the collection, 
storage and use of data, including processing to alter data from an identifiable to non-
identifiable form.  
The importance of this principle is highlighted from the fact that the next article 6 is 
dedicated to concretize the element or ‘subprinciple’ of lawfulness, which does not 
necessarily require a legislative act adopted by a parliament. Article 6 provides six 
bases.110  
 
106 Daniel Rücker, Tobias Kugler, New European general data Regulation, Beck-Hart-Nomos 2018, p.49 
107 Christina Tikkinen-Piri, Anna Rohunen, Jouni Markkula, EU General Data Protection Regulation: 
Changes and implications for personal data collecting companies, Computer Law & Security Review: The 
International Journal of Technology Law and Practice 5 (2017) 
108 in contrast to Article 8 which contains special provisions for a special category of data subjects, 
namely children and falls out of the scope of this paper 
109 Art. 83 (5) (a) 
110 Recital 41 
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4.3.1.1. First basis: ‘consent’  art. 6 (1) (a) 
The first basis for the processing to be lawful is the acquisition of consent from the 
data subject, specifically for the purposes for which the data is processed.111  
Consent is further elaborated in article 7, which underlines that it has to be given 
freely via a positive act, as absence of refusal doesn’t suffice, be informed according to 
article 14, specific, unambiguous and has to remain for the entire duration of the 
processing, as it is withdrawable, according to article 7 (3).112  
Such high threshold for consent, particularly as elaborated in recital 39, makes it 
particularly difficult, if not impossible for companies to acquire. To be adequately 
informed according to the specifications of the law, the data subject has not only to be 
given a thorough text of the conditions of the processing, but also the same data 
subject has to herself process these conditions in order to provide a conscious consent. 
Expectations that an individual will make an informed decision about privacy when 
faced with competing considerations to be weighed in a single moment of absolute 
consent, seem optimistic. It is furthermore observed, that the idea of social media 
users making conscious, rational and autonomous choices about the disclosure of their 
personal data is highly 'questionable.113 
Thus, what happens in practice is that lawyers compose long texts, which often 
nobody, not even the entrepreneurs read and the data subject just ticks, or signs. 
When such texts are submitted to courts, they are unlikely to be admitted as grounds 
for a lawful consent. And even when a collector of data undoubtedly obtains consent, 
he still cannot know for how long, because it depends on the absolute and arbitrary 
volition of the data subject, who can withdraw it anytime, a fact which creates great 
uncertainty to the data controller or processor.   
 
111 Art. 6 (1) (a) 
112 Recital 39 
113 Sheng Yin Soh, Privacy Nudges: An Alternative Regulatory Mechanism to Informed Consent for Online 
Data Protection Behaviour, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 67 (2019). 
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4.3.1.2. Sixth basis: ‘legitimate interest’  art. 6 (1) (f) 
A survey114 showed that companies are aware of such demanding requirements and 
that they view “legitimate interest”, which is an alternative basis115 to consent as an 
easier reliance.116  
It has to be also noted that, according to Article 29 Working party, when the initial 
basis of processing is consent, it is forbidden to “swap” this basis to another one for 
example legitimate interest,117 if consent is withdrawn. Such requirement seems 
unjustifiable, since the other alternative five bases of article 6 are of equal strength to 
the consent. What if the two simultaneous bases are contract and consent and the 
data subject later withdraws consent? It is absurd to suggest that the personal data 
would no longer be processible, although a contract will be still binding.    
Nevertheless, to justify a legitimate interest in the first place is not easy.118 What is a 
legitimate interest, it is not defined in the GDPR. Of course, it has to be in accordance 
with the law in general, to be legitimate.  
The GDPR gives some non-exhaustive examples of the legitimate interests for example 
in recital 47, such as when the data subject is a client, or for preventing fraud, or for 
marketing purposes, but there cannot be a clear distinction to a legitimate purpose of 
the article 5 (1) (b) for example. Somebody cannot help but wonder, why preventing 
fraud is a legitimate interest of art. 6 (f) and not a legitimate purpose of art. 5 (1) (b). A 
purpose is literally a target, whereas an interest means a psychological relationship or 
stake to something.  It is obvious that a clear distinction is hard to be made.  
Laws are destined to contain abstract terms, because no legislator can foresee all 
possible circumstances and legal scholars are doomed to scholastically dig under the 
words. However, when a law contains more than one abstract term with a similar 
meaning, apart from legal insecurity, the outcome is often confusion. 
 
114 The Centre for Information Policy Leadership & AvePoint, 'Organisational Readiness for The European 
Union General Data Protection Regulation' (AvePoint 2017), downloadable after registration at 
<http://www.informationpolicycentre.com/ global-readiness-benchmarks-for-gdpr.htm l>. 
115Article 6 (f) 
116 Wim Nauwelaerts, GDPR - The Perfect Privacy Storm: You Can Run from the Regulator, but You 
Cannot Hide from the Consumer, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 253 (2017). 
117 Article 29 Working party, Guidelines on consent under Regulation 2016/679 [2017] p.23 
118 Wim Nauwelaerts, GDPR - The Perfect Privacy Storm: You Can Run from the Regulator, but You 
Cannot Hide from the Consumer, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 253 (2017) 
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According to the findings of the second Global GDPR Readiness Report released on 
March 26, 2018, tracking the GDPR implementation efforts of over 235 multinational 
organizations, legitimate interest remains the area most in need of clarity under the 
GDPR, followed by data protection impact assessments and risk, breach notification, 
notice and consent, and privacy by design.119 
Nevertheless, defining the concept of the legitimate interest of art. 6 (1) (f), which is 
the fifth alternate basis for lawful processing, is not the only difficulty, as a bearer of a 
legitimate interest also has to prove, that such a legitimate interest is not overriding 
the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. The term 
“override” refers to a central examination procedure in the data protection law: The 
“weighing”, or “balancing”, a judicial task, which we are going to comment on later.  
4.3.1.3. Second basis: ‘performance of a contract’  art. 6 (1) (b) 
Coming back, after having jumped to the article 6 (1) (f), the second alternate basis for 
processing to be lawful is the necessity of the processing for the performance of a 
contract  of article 6 (1) (b), which is not entirely alternate to the  previous one 
(consent), but rather a subcategory of it, as no contract can be formed without the 
willing exchange of the necessary details.  
The raison d'être of this basis is, that if a contract is still binding, even if the data 
subject withdraws her consent, the processing remains lawful. This basis is one of the 
most concrete, but is also self-evident. Because if it didn’t exist (a paranoid 
assumption), this would mean that data protection put an end to contracts altogether. 
The mere existence of this concrete clause may allow the connotation that the 
legislator by needing to include a basis so self-evident in the law, implies, if not 
underlines, the lawfulness of the processing of personal data as an exception and not 
the rule.  
4.3.1.4. Third basis: ‘legal obligation’  art. 6 (1) (c) 
The third alternate basis is compliance with a legal obligation of the controller of 
article 6 (1) (c), which together with the fifth basis of point (e), namely the 
 
119CIPL & AvePoint, 2nd GDPR Organisational Readiness Survey Report, accessible at 
https://www.informationpolicycentre.com/global-readiness-benchmarks-for-gdpr.html 
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performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller, are to be laid down in either European or Member 
State legislation, to which the controller is subject. These two alternate bases 
constitute a serious crack in the harmonization of the data protection regulation, in 
view of the varying national policies of the member states.   
Furthermore, according to the CJEU, the processing has to be necessary for the 
compliance with the legal obligation.120 
4.3.1.5. Fourth basis: ‘vital interests’  art. 6 (1) (d) 
The fourth alternate basis of lawfulness is the protection of the vital interests of the 
data controller or another natural person. Recital 46 defines the term “vital interest” 
as an interest which is essential for the life of the data subject.121 Risking a brash 
assumption, I would say that the need of the legislator to clarify again something so 
self-evident, as that human life is above privacy, seems either another implicit 
expression of how sacred privacy is, that risks to be considered on par with the human 
life, or naïveté.  
4.3.1.6. Fifth basis: ‘performance of a task’  art. 6 (1) (e) 
The fifth alternate basis of lawfulness, that data processing “is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official 
authority vested in the controller” according to Article 6 (1)(e) is most likely to be 
appropriate for public authorities processing personal data without individual 
consent.122 
 
These are the six alternate bases or conditions of the “subprinciple” of lawfulness of 
the first principle ‘lawfulness, fairness and transparency’ of art. 5 (1).  
Continuing with the other two terms (or subprinciples) of this clause, “fairly” is equally 
if not more abstract than the others. Does “fairness” imply equality of guns, or that 
 
120 Case C-496/17, Deutsche Post AG v Hauptzollamt Köln [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:26 para. 58; see also 
Case C-201/14, Bara and Others [2015] EU:C:2015:638, para. 34 
121 Daniel Rücker, Tobias Kugler, New European general data Regulation, Beck-Hart-Nomos 2018, p80 
122 Jessica Bell; Stergios Aidinlis; Hannah Smith; Miranda Mourby; Heather Gowans; Susan E. Wallace; 
Jane Kaye, Balancing Data Subjects' Rights and Public Interest Research, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 45 
(2019). 
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ethics must apply? Is it ever possible that a processing is lawful, according to the above 
five conditions of art. 6 and not fair? Don’t expect an answer neither from the recitals. 
123 
I would say that the term fair in art 5 (1) (a) is verbalism. Aside of the processing of 
personal data, is there any activity in general, which any law allows to be conducted in 
unfair modus? The consequence of verbalism in a law, where every word has to have if 
not an exact meaning, at least a ‘reason d’être’, is that it leads to fruitless over-analysis 
(as maybe is the case with this paper), but also to insecurity and reserve. When a 
prohibition is general and extensive and somebody cannot figure what is allowed 
because the exceptions to the prohibition are ambiguous and vague; when he even 
has to ensure that he processes the data ‘fairly’ (according to whose standards?), he 
may choose to abstain from data processing altogether, to avoid the risk of 
infringement, which will not facilitate the flow of information, a target of the GDPR 
according to its recitals.  
Adding to the confusion, the CJEU commands that the requirement the processing to 
be fair, according to article 5 (1), means the obligation to inform the data subject of 
the purposes of the subsequent processing, which is the same with the transparency 
obligation.124       
On the contrary, the term “transparent” is one of the most specific of the GDPR. The 
processing is transparent if all information about it is given to the data subject. Such 
obligation for transparency is concretized according to the provisions of articles 12-15, 
which provide specific relevant rights bestowed to the data subject.  
The obligation for transparency is also one of the few elements of the principles 
against which no objection can be supported.125 The processing should be transparent 
and the relevant rights of the articles 12-15 are themselves “fair”. They serve to reduce 
mistrust and check arbitrariness of the controller. 
The only remark is that the GDPR may rightly promote transparency, regarding the 
information provided to the data subject, but its unfriendly regime towards disclosure 
of personal data is functioning the opposite way, reducing transparency of the actions 
 
123 See recital 60 which gives identical interpretation to ‘fairness’ and ‘transparecy’ as the adequate 
provision of information to the data subject 
124 Case C-496/17, Deutsche Post AG v Hauptzollamt Köln [2019] ECLI:EU:C:2019:26 para. 59 
125 Article 29 Working party, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/679 [2017] p.6 
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of politicians or public servants, who fortify themselves behind personal data 
protection. 126 
4.3.2. Second principle: ‘purpose limitation’ art. 5 (1) (b) 
 
The second principle is labeled “purpose limitation”, according to which data must be 
collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ and not further processed in a 
manner that is incompatible with those purposes. We mentioned above the difficulty 
to legally distinguish between a purpose and an interest. 
Examples of cases where law enforcement authorities request access to personal data 
initially collected by third parties for a different purpose are numerous. Many of them 
relate to the legal obligation of private parties to retain and disclose personal data to 
law enforcement authorities, such as in the fields of air transport, where according to 
directive EU 2016/681 airlines have to retain passenger data, or of banking for anti-
laundering uncovering purposes, or of telecommunications, according to Directive 
2006/24/EC.127 Due to the availability of data and technological means to process 
them, the repurposing of data in the sense of re-use for a different purpose, is a 
growing phenomenon. When personal data are repurposed to be used in a different 
context, that repurposing might challenge the principle of purpose limitation. 
Following that principle, personal data collected for a specific purpose should be used 
for compatible purposes or further processed under a different legal basis. The 
situation becomes complicated when personal data have been collected in a particular 
context (such as commercial) and are further processed in a different one (such as law 
enforcement). But when rules on data protection are split between two instruments, 
like in the new EU data protection framework, the situation becomes even more 
complicated. The new framework is composed of a general legal text, the GDPR, and of 
 
126 See 5.9. 
127 Which was however invalidated by the EUCJ; see Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights 
Ireland and Seitlinger and Others [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:238; Catherine Jasserand, Subsequent Use of 
GDPR Data for a Law Enforcement Purpose: The Forgotten Principle Purpose Limitation, 4 Eur. Data Prot. 
L. Rev. 153 (2018). 
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a specific legal text applicable to data processing in the field of law enforcement, 
Directive 2016/680128. 
4.3.3. Third principle: ‘data minimization’ art. 5 (1) (c) 
The third principle is labeled ‘data minimization’ according to which personal data 
have to be adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary to achieve those 
purposes. It is self-evident that adequacy and necessity are abstract and subjective 
terms.  
Moreover, at the time of collection of the data more often than not it is not possible to 
know the needs for data, that will emerge later. At the time of the signing of a contract 
for example, it is not known whether the parties will end up adversaries in a litigation. 
The latter often requires additional data, which may be ‘not necessary’ for the 
performance of the contract. ‘Necessity’ is an element of one of the cornerstones of 
European Law, the general principle of proportionality129 but it has been analyzed 
(primarily by the European Judiciary) in retrospect, not as a prediction.  
4.3.4. Fourth principle: ‘accuracy’ art. 5 (1) (d) 
The fourth principle is labeled “accuracy”, requiring data to be accurate and, where 
necessary, up to date, terms which are more concrete. Nevertheless, their necessity is 
questionable, since when the inaccuracy derogates the data subject, there are in every 
legal order civil as well as penal provisions protecting against defamation. Moreover, 
the requirement of the data to be always kept up to date may appear somewhat 
utopic, especially in the age of big data.130  
4.3.5. Fifth principle: ‘storage limitation’ art. 5 (1) (e) 
The fifth principle is labeled “storage limitation”, which requires data to be kept in an 
identifiable form for no longer than necessary. This principle is encompassed in article 
17 which formally introduces the so much debated “right to be forgotten”. 
The CJEU in Google Spain had firmly established the significance of timeliness of 
personal data, stating that Article 6(c) to (e) of the DPD required that data be 
 
128 Police and Criminal Justice Directive; Catherine Jasserand, Subsequent Use of GDPR Data for a Law 
Enforcement Purpose: The Forgotten Principle Purpose Limitation, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 153 (2018). 
129 TEU art 5 
130 See later, ch.5.6.  
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“adequate, relevant, and not excessive in relation to the purposes” of the data 
processing. 131 The meaning of this is that data might ‘age’ to become inadequate, 
irrelevant, or excessive. When this point is reached, the Court concluded that the 
information must be removed. But the Court didn’t specify, when data goes beyond 
the “coming of age”. 132  
The principle of ‘storage limitation’ is the framework of the articles 17 and 18133, which 
provide some conditions134 for this relevance of necessity to time, but even though 
they are analytical, they still are abstract and sometimes overlapping to other 
provisions of the GDPR. Moreover, articles 17 and 18 introduce rights, which means 
that the application of the provisions is subject to the exercise of the rights by the data 
subject. This leads to the conclusion that the principle of storage limitation is 
applicable only when the data subject is exercising its relevant rights. Otherwise, if we 
considered the principle of storage limitation as a general obligation, which means that 
there could be an infringement, even if no data subject exercised its rights, then the 
nature of the provisions of articles 17 and 18 as rights and not just specifications of the 
principle, would be contradictory. But this is the interpretation of this paper, whereas 
in the context of approach of the European legislator, who includes general principles 
together with detailed provisions, the intention may be the coexistence of a general 
obligation which includes the right and the same right again, under specific conditions.  
4.3.5. Sixth principle: ‘storage limitation’ art. 5 (1) (f) 
The sixth principle is labeled “integrity and confidentiality” according to which the 
processing has to be conducted in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the 
data.135 This principle refers mainly to the articles 33-34 and the rest of the security 
technical obligations.  This is one of the two new principles, that didn’t exist in the 
DPD95 and highlights the advent of technology and especially the hazards of digital 
information technology, such as hacking, which were not so severe in the time of the 
adoption of the Directive. 
 
131 Google Spain SL v. AEPD, para. 92. 
132 David J. Stute, Privacy Almighty? The CJEU's Judgment in Google Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 Mich. J. Int'l L. 
665 (2015). 
133 Article 17 ‘right to erasure’, article 18 ‘right to restriction’ 
134 Out of the scope of this paper 
135 See also recital 49  
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4.3.5. Seventh principle: ‘accountability’ art. 5 (2) 
Finally, the seventh new principle is labeled “accountability”136 for compliance with 
each of these principles to be demonstrable by the accountable data controller, which 
is also self-evident.  
Importantly, the GDPR provides for research exemptions from both the “purpose 
limitation” principle in Article 5 (1)(b) and the “storage limitation” principle in Article 
5(1)(e), subject to considerable safeguards set out in Article 89 (1) being met.137 
 
5. CRITISISM 
The European Data protection regulation expressed in its latest version by the GDPR 
poses an array of difficulties.  
5.1. Subjective approaces of privacy 
First of all, the subject of protection, namely privacy, may hardly be considered a 
“tangible” right; on the contrary, as already seen, it depends on the subjective view of 
what everybody considers private. Equally difficult is the appreciation of the harm 
inflicted138, as it depends on the psychological effect of the violation to the individual. 
We saw for example, that Germans are surprisingly relaxed with nudity, a condition 
which usually ranks very high in what people consider private.  
Another example are again the Dutch. Whereas activities such as video surveillance of 
workplaces139 in Europe and even of public places such as streets in Greece are 
sometimes considered a violation of privacy140, the Dutch are notorious for having big 
windows on their houses without curtains and shades. The reason may be a Calvinist 
remnant in the predominantly atheistic Dutch society, but the striking consequence is, 
that a passer-by can often peek inside the most private of places, the residence.141  
 
136 Art 5 par.2 
137 Jessica Bell; Stergios Aidinlis; Hannah Smith; Miranda Mourby; Heather Gowans; Susan E. Wallace; 
Jane Kaye, Balancing Data Subjects' Rights and Public Interest Research, 5 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 45 
(2019). 
138 Tal Z. Zarsky, The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 151 (2015) 
139 See Köpke v Germany, App no 420/07 (ECHR, 5 October 2010), Antovit and Mirkovit v Montenegro 
App no 70838/13 (ECHR, 28 November 2017) 
140 See Directive 1/2011, Decisions 53/2011 and 136/2011 of the Greek Data Protection Authority 
141 See https://dutchreview.com/culture/why-dont-the-dutch-like-to-use-curtains/, 
https://www.expatica.com/nl/living/household/xenophobes-guides-open-curtains-107782/ 
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Such variability of approaches makes it very difficult for the jurisprudence to 
harmonically interpret the abstract principles throughout the EU. 
5.2. Pace of technological progress 
The GDPR introduced some important innovations of the regulation, but it is 
questionable whether it broke new ground addressing the issues posed to privacy 
protection by the ever-evolving cultural mentalities and by the rapid advent of digital 
technology.142 However, to be fair,  maybe it is utopic to expect the simultaneous 
accomplishment of the two main objects of the European data protection regulation: 
The protection of privacy from digital technology and the harmonization of the 
regulation in the EU, because of the fragmentation of national views on the subject, 
the pace of the evolution of digital technology and the unfair race with the notoriously 
slow European regulators.   
Digital information technology penetrates so extensively every moment of everyday 
life and it evolves so rapidly, that today's specific regulation will most likely become 
obsolete tomorrow. 143  
The GDPR, may contain many detailed provisions aiming primarily to address modern 
technology, but in a silent acceptance of this reality, the core of regulation is general 
concepts, namely the principles, which allow the judge to step into the shoes of the 
slow legislator.  
5.3. Complexity 
The length of the GDPR compared to the DPD and even more so when compared to 
the 1980 CoE Convention 108, has also been a subject for critic and even regarded as a 
sign of weakness and lack of capacity to trust the sacred principles.144 
A major challenge is the companies’ lack of awareness and understanding of the 
requirements that the GDPR imposes through its new detailed rules. A recent Decision 
 
142 Daniel Rücker, Tobias Kugler, New European general data Regulation, Beck-Hart-Nomos 2018, p.49; 
Simon Davies, The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle, 2 Eur. Data Prot. 
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by the Greek DPA imposed a fine of 150.000 euros to a company because of violations 
apart from the principles of processing also of technical requirements by articles 24 
and 34.145 Such demands bring out the need to review and revise current data privacy 
practices, organizational systems, personnel training and technological data protection 
measures, as well as possibly plan new ones to ensure compliance with the GDPR. 146  
5.4. Balancing 
The new technical requirements introduced by the GDPR raise more questions than 
answers in relation to how DPAs, controllers and processors, all accountable by the 
law, are going to achieve compliance in practice, and how they are going to enforce 
the rules.147  
Nevertheless, more than the technical requirements, criticism attracts the fact that the 
balancing act needed to implement the principles of the European data protection law 
falls primarily on the shoulders of such DPOs, controllers and processors, who have to 
concretize such abstract terms as ‘necessity’. In the case of Google Spain for example, 
not only the lack of regard or weight the Court gives to the freedom of expression has 
been critisized, but also that the Court leaves it up to the provider of the search 
engine, in this case Google, to perform the balancing exercise.148 Having in mind the 
vast amounts of data processed, how can a search engine comply with obligations 
imposed on controllers by the principles under Articles 6 and 7, such as judging when it 
is “longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected,”? And 
how realistic is for a search engine to verify consent for the personal data it processes, 
as such data have been collected by infinite other controllers? As it is astutely 
observed, the absurd consequence would be that search engines themselves would be 
illegal under EU law.149 
 
145 Greek DPA Decision 44/2019, par. 31 
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According to ‘The Leff Dictionary of Law’: ‘Balancing: The metaphoric term generally 
used in the law to describe an exceedingly important conceptual operation. In almost 
all conflicts, especially those that make their way into a legal system, there is 
something to be said in favor of two or more outcomes. Whatever result is chosen, 
someone will be advantaged and someone will be disadvantaged; some policy will be 
promoted at the expense of some other. Hence it is often said that a "balancing 
operation" must be undertaken, with the "correct" decision seen as the one yielding the 
greatest net benefit.’150  
Balancing is the main tool for judges to determine the outcome of a case when there is 
a conflict of rights or interests. What is 'balanced' is not the pleasure an act brings 
about against the pain it causes. Instead, rights are balanced against each other, or 
against a general interest, such as national security, public health, or even against 
public morals.151 
For example, the ECHR found in Barbulescu vs Romania152 that even though Article 8 
ECHR protects individuals against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it 
may also generate positive obligations for the legislator, such as adopting measures 
designed to secure respect for private life. To fulfill their positive obligations under the 
ECHR, the states had to find a balance between the competing interests which may 
include competing private and public interests or Convention rights.153  
Similarly, after the judgment in Barbulescu vs Romania, concerning the monitoring of 
employees' email communications by private employers, the ECHR heard a case this 
time concerning video surveillance in the workplace.154 After having established that 
the applicants' private life was concerned by the video surveillance cameras, the ECtHR 
examined whether the State, by virtue of its positive obligations to adopt measures 
ensuring the respect for individuals' right to privacy, has correctly balanced the 
employees' right to privacy, the interest of employers in their property rights and, 
finally, the public interest in the proper administration of justice. It found that the 
employer did not comply with the legal obligation to notify the employees of the 
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existence of hidden cameras installed in the workplace. And held that such surveillance 
measures were not justified and appropriate to the legitimate interest pursued namely 
the employer's right to property and not necessary and proportionate to restricting 
the privacy of the employees.155 
This judgment contrasts with a previous similar case decided by the ECtHR in 2008, 
Koepke v Germany156, regarding the dismissal of a supermarket cashier after having 
been caught by covert video surveillance cameras while stealing. In that case, the ECHR 
had not found any violation of Article 8 ECHR and recognized that national courts had 
correctly struck the balance between the employee's right to protection of private life 
and the employer's interest in the protection of its property rights and the public 
interest in the proper administration of justice.157 
The concept of balancing is explicitly referred only in recitals 4 and 153 of the GDPR: 
‘The right to the protection of personal data is not an absolute right; it must be 
considered in relation to its function in society and be balanced against other 
fundamental rights, in accordance with the principle of proportionality.’158 Member 
States should adopt legislative measures which lay down the exemptions and 
derogations necessary for the purpose of balancing those fundamental rights.159 
Although no material provision explicitly refers to balancing, it is understood that 
because data protection is based on privacy, which is considered a fundamental right, 
the power of data protection regulation to limit other fundamental rights often has to 
be the outcome of a balancing procedure. 
Notably, article 6 (1) (f) providing for the lawfulness of the processing based on 
legitimate interest of the controller, mentions the condition that such interests are not 
overridden by the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject. 
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party explicitly mentioned, analysed and 
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provided guidelines for the balancing test required when implementing article 7 (f) of 
the DPD, which is the same provision to the article 6 (1) (f) of the GDPR. 160 
The question is, are the controllers and processors, who can be anybody, capable of 
conducting such balancing acts? Imagine for example that a lawyer investigates the 
feasibility to bring a tort to litigation. He needs several pieces of information, not only 
if the defendant has property. It may sound trivial, but even the fathers’ name may be 
missing161. The mere basis in the principles of articles 5 and 6 able to provide 
lawfulness to a disclosure of such personal data is the legitimate interest. The 
controller in possession of such personal data, how likely is it to be capable of ensuring 
the mere existence of the claim; of finding that it constitutes a legitimate interest and 
of balancing the overriding interests? Will the average controller, or the appointed 
DPO, if there is one, study the evidence of a tort case even before the filling of a 
lawsuit, and decide for the disclosure? Most unlikely. He will probably play it safe and 
refuse. And just imagine the case of more serious personal data, needed as evidence.   
Moreover, serious critique, even before the introduction of the GDPR, earned the 
expansion of the scope of who is considered controller. According to Advocate General 
Niilo Jääskinen: “The potential scope of application of the Directive in the modern 
world has become surprisingly wide. Let us think of a European law professor who has 
downloaded, from the Court’s website, the essential case-law of the Court to his laptop 
computer. In terms of the Directive, the professor could be considered to be a 
‘controller’ of personal data originating from a third party. The professor has files 
containing personal data that are processed automatically for search and consultation 
within the context of activities that are not purely personal or household related. In 
fact, anyone today reading a newspaper on a tablet computer or following social 
media on a smartphone appears to be engaged in processing of personal data with 
automatic means, and could potentially fall within the scope of application of the 
Directive to the extent this takes place outside his purely private capacity. In addition, 
the wide interpretation given by the Court to the fundamental right to private life in a 
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data protection context seems to expose any human communication by electronic 
means to the scrutiny by reference to this right” 162 
5.5. Freedom to conduct business (art. 16 of the Charter)  
The elevated level of data protection by GDPR, the strict liability of both controllers 
and processors and the height of the relevant administrative penalties has very much 
increased concerns among enterprises.163  
As research and development is based on information, and because data protection 
legislation raises barriers to the free flow of it, one of the anticipated concerns is that 
the GDPR may harm entrepreneurial innovation. So, it is remarkable, that the opposite 
logic is supported by regulators, namely that privacy enhances trust, which leads to 
more online and virtual engagement, which leads to greater market, social and 
technical innovation.164 
According to the Commissioner Viviane Reding ‘The new rules also give EU companies 
an advantage in global competition. Under the reformed regulatory framework, they 
will be able to assure their customers that valuable personal data will be treated with 
the necessary care and diligence. Trust in a coherent EU regulatory regime will be a key 
asset for service providers and an incentive for investors looking for optimal conditions 
when locating services.’165 
However attractive such a reasoning may sound, it clearly reflects the bureaucratic 
way of thinking, not of the entrepreneur and it is hard to agree to a paradox that 
putting obstacles to the flow of data through regulation (because that is what the 
GDPR does) is going to give an advantage against oversees companies, who operate 
unregulated. The simple counter-argument is that, if regulation was giving a 
competitive advantage, then companies would apply the rules themselves and no law 
would be necessary. 166 Whether privacy rights are ‘weightier’ than profits is 
debatable, but the assumption that the GDPR instead of harming profits, will push 
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them upwards facilitating innovation, cannot be supported. Strict regulation promotes 
business climate and attracts investors, when it addresses the function of the state, 
the public sector and the judiciary; when it tackles corruption and exclusion; when it 
reinforces competition rules. But not when it restricts the private sector from violating 
personal data rights.  
Another argument in favor of the assumed positive impact to innovation is that 
conditions of diminished privacy also impair innovation because a society that permits 
the unchecked ascendancy of surveillance infrastructures, leads individuals to engage 
in constant self-monitoring and conforming behavior-mindsets that are arguably 
destructive to the processes that promote innovation.167 In other words, fear of 
surveillance, stops individuals from engaging in research and development activities, 
which create innovation. However, aside from data protection theorists and 
regulators, it is hard to find entrepreneurs, researchers and academics who claim that 
privacy promotes innovation. Innovation requires infrastructure, venture capital, 
freedom to experiment, cooperation between colleagues, communication webs, and 
access to databases, hardly personal data protection.  
Aside from these theoretical arguments, reality shows that Europe with its strict 
regulation regime lags back in innovation against the United States (with a much more 
lenient personal data protection regime), especially in the field of digital information 
technology. Does anybody think that the GDPR will help Europe produce the 
equivalent of an innovation leader, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, eBay or 
Amazon?   
5.6. Big Data  
Personal Data is said to be the new oil168 and the way modern economies need oil, 
they also need ‘Big Data’.169 Big Data is a field that treats ways to analyze, 
systematically extract information from, or otherwise deal with data sets that are too 
large or complex to be dealt with by traditional data-processing application 
software. 170 It is collected primarily in an automated way, through myriads of devices, 
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sensors, applications, which record preferences, websites visits, physical movements, 
communications, transactions even biometrics. It is stored using sophisticated 
mechanisms on distributed databases and it is used in advanced analytical processes 
and thereafter applied in a variety of contexts. Big data has the potential to create vast 
amounts of value in many sectors, improving economies, determine new winners in 
the private sector and bring consumers benefits and conveniences.171 It is already 
transforming the world and nobody can really predict the scope and nature of the 
impact of Big Data impact to the future.172 
The GDPR indirectly addresses Big Data in the article 22, which introduces provisions 
regulating decision-making processes, which are both fully automated and 
substantially impact individuals, such as credit applications or recruiting. Article 22 
provides the individual with the right not to be subjected to these processes and is the 
most characteristic rejection to the (mostly automated) extraction of Big Data. The 
American law has no equivalent to this right.173 
More importantly Article 5(1)(b) and (c) of the GDPR sets forth the purpose limitation 
and the data minimization principles, which are clearly at odds with the prospect of Big 
Data analyses. When collecting Big Data, due to their nature, it is practically impossible 
for the controllers to predict or imagine methods, usage patterns, exact purposes and 
required volume of the data. To comply with the purpose limitation principle, 
processors have to inform their data subjects of the future forms of processing and 
closely monitor their practices to assure they did not exceed the permitted limits of 
analyses. Carrying out any one of these tasks in the realm of Big Data analytics is hardly 
realistic. 174 The contrast of the data minimization principle to Big Data needs not to be 
analyzed, as the principle is an explicit antithesis to the concept of Big Data.  
Finally, article 25, which introduces the obligation of the controller to implement by 
design and by default appropriate technical and organisational measures such as data 
minimization is totally incompatible with Big Data procedures. 
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Such obstacles and a hostile legal regime against Big Data is very likely to turn Big Data 
investment and enterprises away from Europe, which will not only effect in losses in 
profits and jobs but it will also leave the EU further behind in the ‘next big thing’ of 
progress. 
5.7. Free speech-freedom of expression  
When search results are delisted, the right to freedom to receive as well as impart 
information, the right to freedom of expression for short, is affected as well. When 
people publish information on the web and their publications are harder to find due to 
a delisting, their freedom to impart information is interfered with.175  
Both the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European 
Convention on Human Rights protect the right 'to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.176 
According to the ECtHR, Article 10 of the ECHR applies not only to the content of 
information but also to the means of transmission or reception since any restriction 
imposed on the means necessarily interferes with the right to receive and impart 
information. 177 
Similarly, as the Advocate General in the Google Spain case held, a “search engine 
service provider lawfully exercises his freedom of expression when he makes available 
internet information location tools relying on a search engine.”178 
5.8. Scientific Research  
Concerns have also been expressed for a potential disruption to the scientific research, 
particularly in the field of social sciences, although not as convincing as in other fields. 
It is claimed that negative implications may arise from the introduction of 
pseudonymous data as a subset of personal data179 and that the GDPR may disrupt the 
access to administrative data for research which serves the public interest, especially 
 
175 Stefan Kulk; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Freedom of Expression and Right to Be Forgotten Cases 
in the Netherlands after Google Spain, 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. p.114 (2015). 
176 Art 11(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and art 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. 
177 Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (ECHR, 22 May 1990) [47]. 
178 Opinion of Advocate General Jaaskinen, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, par. 131 
179 Leslie Stevens, The Proposed Data Protection Regulation and Its Potential Impact on Social Sciences 
Research in the UK, 1 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. p. 97 (2015). 
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as it adds some uncertainty as to the scope of processing of personal data that public 
authorities can undertake without the justification of a new, separate legal basis.180   
However, several articles and recitals181 clarify that further processing for archiving 
purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical 
purposes should be considered to be compatible lawful processing operations, which 
seems to be adequate to remove uncertainty, provided that the fear of the 
accountability principle, especially among public servants will not stand in the way.  
5.9. Transparency  
The principles of GDPR may also conflict with the principle of transparency of the 
conduct of public authorities. The balancing of the two sides pose difficult and 
controversial issues, without a clear acceptance of the predominance of public 
transparency, as shown by the case-law of the CJEU.182 
In Dennekamp Case a journalist was denied public access to European Parliament 
documents relating to a pension scheme for MEPs. The General Court held that no 
automatic priority can be conferred on the principle of transparency or access to 
information183 over the right to protection of personal data and that the conflicting 
interests had to be balanced, or, in the words of the Court, “weighed up”. 184 Personal 
data shall only be disclosed to recipients “if the recipient establishes the necessity of 
having the data transferred and if there is not the slightest reason to assume that the 
data subjects’ legitimate interests would be prejudiced”.185 
The Court thus set the threshold high, allowing only the disclosure of the names of 
those MEPs who participated in such decisions, but not of those who although 
members of the pension scheme, did not participate in the vote for it.186  
In ‘’ClientEarth and PAN Europe’’ case the applicants were environmental NGOs. They 
applied for disclosure of the names of external experts who authored a European Food 
 
180 Ibid., p.98 
181 Art. 5 (1) (b) and (e), 9 (2) (j), 14 (5) (b), 17 (3) (d), 21 (6) 89  ; recitals 26, 52, 53, 62, 65, 71, 113, 156, 
162, 163  
182 Jan Oster, Of Money, Poison and Secrets: Balancing Freedom of Information against Data Protection, 
2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 272 (2016). 
183 Articles 1 and 11(2) TEU and Article 15(1 ) TFEU 
184 Case T-115/13 - Dennekamp v Parliament, par.116 
185 Case T-115/13 - Dennekamp v Parliament, par.117, 119 
186 Jan Oster, Of Money, Poison and Secrets: Balancing Freedom of Information against Data Protection, 
2 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 274 (2016) 
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Safety Authority (EFSA) guidance document on pesticides. The General Court had 
dismissed the applicants' action for annulment of EFSA's refusal to allow access to the 
relevant documents for reasons of protection of personal data of the external 
experts.187 However, the ECJ balancing between data protection and transparency, set 
aside the General Court's decision and decided in favor of the disclosure, holding that 
the 'climate of suspicion of EFSA', which is 'often accused of partiality because of its 
use of experts with vested interests due to their links with industrial lobbies', resonates 
'the necessity of ensuring the transparency of EFSA's decision-making process', which 
increases public confidence.188  
Another example is the case ‘’Manni’’.189 The CJEU examining the balancing between 
personal data protection against the principle of the free flow of and access to public 
registers, appeared to bend more towards transparency and the interests of third 
parties regarding information about companies, than to a right to be forgotten, but 
also found that such disclosures are subject ‘on the basis of a case-by-case 
assessment’, avoiding to adopt a clear stance, even on the need for absolute 
transparency in the field of corporates, as in every liberal economy, anywhere outside 
Europe. 190 
Especially in Greece there is an overzealous protection of personal data, when it comes 
to public servants or politicians, taking advantage of the abstractness and extensive 
scope of the provisions.  
An example was a public debate about the salaries of the employees of the public tv 
channels (ERT), which were rumored to be scandalously high in spite of the very low 
attendance figures of the channels. The salaries are paid by the tax-payers and some 
MPs officially asked for their disclosure. The competent minister refused, citing 
personal data. 191 
 
187 Ibid., p.273 
188 Case C-615/13 P - ClientEarth and PAN Europe v EFSA par. 53, 56 
189 Case C-398/15 – Manni 
190 Case C-398/15 – Manni par. 49; Eike Michael Frenzel, Facilitating the Flow of Public Information: The 
CJEU in Favour of Distinctive Rule/Exception Regulations in Member States, 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 283 
(2017). 
191 Pashos Mandravelis, Kathimerini 9.11.2017 
<https://www.kathimerini.gr/933854/opinion/epikairothta/politikh/ta-kryfa-dedomena> 
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Such practices are usual in Greece, so when the economy defaulted, the public 
conception was that a small group of powerful people ‘’stole the money’’, instead of 
that there were widespread fiscal extravagances in the public sector. 
5.10. Intimidation-exploitation  
The complexity of the GDPR, the expansion of its scope to include every information 
related to an individual and the vagueness of the principles of the processing have 
another side-effect. They gave birth to an ‘army of experts’ selling GDPR compliance 
services.  
According to a pertinent remark “It seems the GDPR rhetoric is suffering from the 
famous Mark Twain quote, 'To a man with a hammer, everything looks like a nail.' We 
cannot call every problem in society a privacy or data protection issue nor should we 
attempt to: recently a privacy lawyer tried to convince me that contract law is a subset 
of privacy law because a contract contains personal data as the names of those signing 
are in it …The GDRP is mainly about exploitation and monetisation, with the famous 
4%-of-global-turnover fine as its crown jewel. Many GDPR-ists behave like ambulance 
chasers and use it for scaring clients.” 192 
The “intimidating” nature of the provisions of the GDPR is also capable of deterring 
people from exposing illegal activities, in fear of infringing the limited understood data 
protection provisions. 
There are also fears that actual intimidation may follow. Similar practices to the 
“Abmahnungen”193 based on German unfair competition law - combined with a fee for 
the production of the letters - could follow to attack supposed privacy violations. Some 
warn of the launch of a new “Abmahnwelle”194, as there are already law firms in 
Germany that are known for mass mailing of such letters, even for minor violations. 
The common practice of such law firms is to send copy-paste letters in very large 
numbers and profit from the chargeable fees which many intimidated recipients pay. 
 
192 Nico van Eijk, About Finding Practical Solutions (without the GDPR), 3 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 311 
(2017). 
193 Cease and desist letters 
194 Wave of such cease and desist letters 
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The GDPR, due to the complexity of its provisions but also the obscurity of the 
principles may be used as a tool for exploitation for such law firms. 195 
This is why others observe that law firms that once lobbied against the GDPR, are now 
opportunistically promoting the same elements of the GDPR, presented as benefits for 
the society.196 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 Jan Henrich, German Unfair Competition Law and the GDPR - Courts Are Indecisive about Parallel 
Remedies, 4 Eur. Data Prot. L. Rev. 515 (2018). 
196 Simon Davies, The Data Protection Regulation: A Triumph of Pragmatism over Principle, 2 Eur. Data 
Prot. L. Rev. 290 (2016). 
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Conclusions 
In liberal states, the law usually provides rules about what it is forbidden so that the 
rest is allowed, unless it is in conflict to a general legal principle. Of course, there is 
also the other way around, that is, activities that because of their nature, they are 
forbidden per se, such as carrying firearms, and the law provides certain exceptions to 
the prohibition. For example, special and exceptional circumstances have to be 
present, in order for a person to acquire a permit to carry a gun.  
Although the GDPR provides as one of its main objectives the facilitation of the free 
flow of personal data197 the general impression extracted from the web of the 
provisions is that the GDPR rather intercepts the flow of information, instead of 
facilitating it. Like the example of the gun permit, it appears that in order to be able to 
process personal data, a controller has to fulfil exceptional preconditions, the 
principles of the GDPR, instead of merely avoiding to infringe them. The processing of 
personal data is generally prohibited, unless you have a right to do it, according to the 
principles.198 
The view of this paper is that the caliber of the European regulation is excessive 
regarding the protection of personal data. The aspects of sensitive or special 
categories of data and the regulation of consent of the children were left outside of 
the analysis, because in these cases no criticism to a strict regulation could be 
supported. Processing of information about religion, political views, sexual 
preferences, health, criminal sentences, perhaps even private sector income and any 
information relating to children should be absolutely exceptional under few strict and 
specific conditions.  
But as for the rest of the personal data, laws such as against illegal interception of 
telecommunications, surveillance in private places, defamation, breach of the 
confidentiality of correspondence and telecommunications or banking secrets, should 
be sufficient to protect the right to privacy.  
Therefore, the regulation instead of describing when the processing of personal data is 
lawful, should have rather enumerated the few exhaustive and specific exceptions.  
 
197 See recitals 3, 9, 53, 123 especially 170 and article 51 
198 Daniel Rücker, Tobias Kugler, New European general data Regulation, Beck-Hart-Nomos 2018, p.51 
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It is understood that such views are against the mainstream perspective, somewhat 
ironically highlighted by the submitting of this paper 3 days after the annual 
international data privacy day.   
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